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A Sign-Post Without Any Sense of
Direction: The Supreme Court's Dance
Around The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
and the Exclusionary Rule In
Hudson v. Michigan
David A. Stuart'
Introduction
POLICE, SEARCH WARRANT... 2
The voices echo through the cracks of the door. Seconds
later the door booms open. 3 Seven police officers rush through.
Booker Hudson jolts up from his chair in the living room. Mo-
mentary chaos reins free as everyone in the house is rounded-
up and the police undertake a search of the premises.4
It is mid-afternoon on a hot August day.5 Seven Detroit po-
lice officers are on their way to Booker Hudson's home.6 In
their possession, they carry with them a valid search warrant
for narcotics. 7 The officers arrive and walk up the path towards
this modest single family home. A few of the officers shout "po-
lice, search warrant" as they arrive.8 After waiting only a few
1. J.D. candidate 2007, Pace University School of Law; B.A. 2004, cum laude,
San Francisco State University. I would like to thank all the people that have
made a difference in my life, especially, my Father, Mother, and four Sisters, and
Willie who used to play blues harmonica in the alley off of Grant Street and Co-
lumbus Avenue. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Leslie Garfield for
her insightful comments on the article and her invaluable guidance throughout my
law school career. All mistakes and opinions are my own.
2. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *2, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360, 126
S. Ct. 2159 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2005), 2004 U.S. Briefs 1360 (LexisNexis). For a similar
statement of the facts, see Brief of Respondent, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360,
126 S. Ct. 2159 (Oct. 11, 2005).
3. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at *2, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360, 126
S. Ct. 2159 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2005), 2004 U.S. Briefs 1360 (LexisNexis).
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *2.
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seconds the officers burst through Mr. Hudson's front door,
finding him sitting up, frightened in his easy chair.9 During the
subsequent search, the officers found twenty-three individual
baggies of "rock" (otherwise known as crack cocaine) and five
individual "rocks," weighing about twenty-five grams on Mr.
Hudson. l0
Police officers have a constitutional duty to knock and an-
nounce their presence before executing a valid search war-
rant." Of course, if the officers have reason to believe that
evidence for which they are searching will be destroyed or their
lives will be in danger, it is not unreasonable for them to bypass
such knock and announce requirements. 12 However, it is undis-
puted that in the above circumstance, the police were in viola-
tion of the knock and announce rule. 13 At trial, Mr. Hudson's
attorney moved to suppress the "rock" obtained as a result of
the illegal entry. 14 The trial court granted this motion to sup-
press. 15 On appeal this decision was reversed and remanded. 16
After a bench trial, Mr. Hudson was convicted of possession
with intent to sell.' 7
The facts outlined above are those of Hudson v. Michigan.8
Hudson encapsulates the dance that our criminal justice system
partakes in daily, struggling to find balance between deterring
unconstitutional police behavior and convicting the guilty for
9. Id. at *1-2 (testimony characterized the entry as "real fast," the officers did
not wait to see if anyone was going to answer the door).
10. Brief for United States Attorney General as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondent at *1-2, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (U.S. Oct. 19,
2005), 2004 U.S. Briefs 1360 (LexisNexis).
11. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
12. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003).
13. The prosecution conceded that the police were in violation of the knock
and announce violation. See Brief for United States Attorney General, supra note
10, at *2-3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. On December 18, 2001 the Michigan Supreme Court denied a leave for
appeal on the grounds that the exclusion is not the proper remedy for violations of
the "knock and announce" requirement. People v. Hudson, 639 N.W.2d 255 (Mich.
2001). The Michigan Supreme Court held that the inevitable discovery dontrine
applied as an exception to the exlcusionary rule in the case of knock and announce
violations. Id.
17. Brief for United States Attorney General, supra note 10, at *2-3.
18. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
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crimes actually committed. 19 There is constant tension between
admittance of relevant evidence obtained illegally and the con-
stitutional protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights against
such illegal searches and seizures.20 Particularly, the Fourth
Amendment is intended to protect us against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 21 The criminal justice system is in-
tended to prosecute and convict the guilty. The exclusionary
rule is injected into this system in order to prevent the wheels of
"justice" from supporting violations of the Constitution.22
The progession of the Hudson case culminated with a re-
cent decision by the United States Supreme Court, holding that
the officers' violation of Mr. Hudson's Fourth Amendment right
to knock and announce did not require exclusion of the evidence
seized as a result.23 This is the first time that the Court has
ever found that the exclusionary rule does not apply to protect
an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment in the context
of a fully protected criminal trial.24 The question certified by
the Supreme Court was on the narrow issue of whether knock
and announce violations require exclusion under the Fourth
Amendment or may be admitted under the inevitable discovery
19. See, e.g., Partricia Manson, Court Upholds Search That Followed 'No-
Knock' Entry, CHI. DAILY LAw BULL., July 15, 2003, at 1.
20. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Murray v. United States: The Bell Tolls for the
Search Warrant Requirement, 64 IND. L.J. 907 (Fall 1989).
21. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S.CoNsT. amend. IV.
22. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (Oct. 1983); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
166 (1986) ("[t]he purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitu-
tion is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution."); Bradley, supra
note 20, at 917.
23. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
24. The requirement of knock and announce is an integral part of the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness prong. The Court has held that in some cases the
exclusionary rule does not apply: Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
364 (1998) (exception for parole revocation proceedings); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (exception for deportation proceedings).
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doctrine.25 In coming to its decision the Court was sharply di-
vided, with a powerful four-justice dissent, written by Justice
Breyer.26 The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, con-
veniently avoided the issue of inevitable discovery, instead fo-
cusing its reasoning on the exclusionary rule and attenuated
causation.27 However, beneath the surface of the Court's rea-
soning, there were important and potentially long-ranging im-
plications concerning the future application of the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
The inevitable discovery doctrine has been applied to a
wide range of circumstances since the Supreme Court gave it
legitimacy in 1988.28 This expansion poses a serious threat to
the continued viability of the Fourth Amendment's warrant re-
quirement. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in
Hudson has only furthered this trend. The Court's revision of
the attenuation principles connected to the exclusionary rule
and its application of those principles to the knock and an-
25. Specifically, the question certified by the Court is:
Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and an-
nounce" violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court
have held, or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations, as the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals have held?
Question Certified, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360 (U.S. June 22, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-01360qp.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2007); Transcript of Oral Argument, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360 (Jan. 9,
2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argu-
ment transcripts.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). See also Steve Lash, Drug Sus-
pect Knocks Police Search Before High Court, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Jan. 9, 2006,
p. 1 .
26. Hudson, 126 U.S. at 2171. Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg.
27. Id. at 2163-65.
28. The Supreme Court first recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine in
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). The doctrine has since been applied in a
variety of circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir.
1998) (illegal "Terry" pat-down justified by inevitable arrest for driving without a
license); United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 2003) (warrant-less
search justified by eventual warrant); United States v. Griffiths, 47 F.3d 74, 78 (2d
Cir. 1995) (inventory search of person); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 971
(1st Cir. 1994) (illegal vehicle search justified by eventual inventory search);
United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that oral
policy requiring search of rental vehicles before return to owners was sufficient to
satisfy burden of inevitable discovery).
506
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss3/5
NO SENSE OF DIRECTION
nounce requirement lay the groundwork for a revolutionary
new view of the Fourth Amendment where warrant-less
searches are upheld under the guise of inevitable discovery.
This article will argue that the Court's decision in Hudson,
coupled with the current expansion of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, all but guarantee's a "show-down" in the Supreme
Court over warrant-less searches. Part I of this article will ex-
amine the historical development of the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Part II will detail the reasoning set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Hudson v. Michigan. Part III will discuss the
general problems associated with the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, including warrant-less searches, and the potential exacer-
bation of those problems by the court's posturing of the
exclusionary rule in Hudson. Lastly, Part IV will look at ways
to limit the inevitable discovery doctrine, while still achieving
the appropriate balance between deterring unconstitutional po-
lice behavior and the harm to society in excluding relevant evi-
dence. Specifically, it will be suggested that limiting
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to only deriva-
tive evidence, not primary, is a proper means to achieving a de-
sired balance, especially in the context of warrant-less
searches.29
I. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
If probable cause alone-without putting in train the process of
applying for a warrant-were enough to invoke the inevitable-dis-
covery doctrine, that would have the same effect as limiting the
exclusionary rule to searches conducted without probable cause.
Perhaps that would be a good development;...30
A. Limiting Exclusion: The Rise of the Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine
The inevitable discovery doctrine gained legal lifeblood in
the Supreme Court decision of Nix v. Williams.31 The doctrine
29. Primary evidence is loosely defined as "tangible materials obtained either
during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). For evidence discovered after the primary illegality-
derivative evidence-the question to be considered is the degree of taint.
30. United States v. Elder, 466 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.).
31. 467 U.S. 431 (1988).
20071 507
5
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:503
acts as an exception to the exclusionary rule on the basis that
the illegally seized evidence should not be excluded because it
would have been discovered inevitably by legal means. 32 Al-
though the doctrine had been utilized in the past by circuit and
state court decisions, 33 the Supreme Court decision in Nix legiti-
mized its use as a valid exception to the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence. In Nix, the police obtained the location of
the body of ten-year old Pamela Powers through an illegal con-
fession spurred by a "Christian burial speech" by one of the of-
ficers. 34 Prior to Williams' confession a search team was only
two and one-half miles from where the body was found.35 The
Court was faced with the difficult decision of excluding the body
from evidence even though a search team would have found the
body anyway. The Court held that the body was admissible in
trial since it would have inevitably been discovered without any
casual connection to the illegal confession. 36
The inevitable discovery doctrine has developed as a legiti-
mate exception to the exclusionary rule,37 which requires that
evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or unlawful
entry is the fruit of the illegality and should be suppressed. 38
32. Id. at 444.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 435 (1984). Specifically, the officer's con-
versation was as follows:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
road .... They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel
that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body
is ... and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it.
And since we will be going right past the area [where the body is] on the way
into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the par-
ents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little
girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [Eve] and murdered
.... [After] a snow storm [we may not be] able to find it at all.
Id. The Supreme Court in a prior decision dealing with this same case held that
the Defendant's incriminating statements were an interrogation in violation of his
right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
35. Nix, 467 U.S. at 436.
36. Id. at 449-50.
37. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 11.4(a) (West, 4th ed. 2004).
38. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1920);
Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 166 (1986) ("[tlhe purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution.").
508
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The rationale behind the rule is that exclusion is the only way
to deter illegal police behavior and achieve compliance with
Fourth Amendment protections. 39 However, evidence obtained
through an illegal search or unlawful entry is not always inad-
missible. A few important exceptions to the rule of exclusion
have developed through common law.40 Exceptions such as at-
tenuation,41 good faith,42 and the independent source doctrine43
have developed where exclusion does not serve the deterrent
purposes so as to outweigh the harm to society in excluding rel-
evant and incriminating evidence. 44
Outside of the general limitations of the exclusionary rule,
a number of elements have developed to burden extensive and
potentially abusive use of the inevitable discovery doctrine.45
The prosecution must establish by a preponderance of evidence
that the evidence would have been inevitably obtained through
lawful means.46 There should be a showing that there is no
causal nexus between the evidence sought to be admitted and
the taint of the illegal search or entry.47 Essential to admissibil-
39. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166; Stewart, supra note 22, at 1389; Nix, 467 U.S.
at 442-43 (reasoning that the "prosecution is not to be put in a better position than
it would have been in if no illegality as occurred."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486 (1976).
40. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 11.4(a).
41. Wong Sung, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (reasoning that "[wie need not hold that all
evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to
light but for illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a
case is 'whether granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which the instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that ille-
gality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.").
42. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
43. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
44. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (reason-
ing that "[tihe notion of the "dissipation of the taint" attempts to mark the point at
which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action becomes so attenuated
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.").
45. For example the First Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a three
prong test requiring (1) that the legal means by which the evidence would have
been discovered was truly independent; (2) that the use of the legal means would
have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence; (3) that applying the inevitable
discovery rule would not provide an incentive for police misconduct or significantly
weaken constitutional protections. United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 28 (1st
Cir. 2006).
46. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 (1984). The prosecution bears the burden proving
"demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification." Id. at 444 n.5.
47. Id. at 448.
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ity is the determination of whether exclusion would place the
police in a worse position or in the same position, had the ille-
gality never occurred. 48 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is
not to punish the police by putting them in a worse position-it
is to deter future police misconduct by placing the police in the
same position. 49 The analysis must begin at the point where the
violation occurred and ask the question of what would have
happened had the unlawful search never occurred. 50
There is much disagreement among courts as to further re-
quirements and scope of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
Some courts have held that the doctrine does not apply to pri-
mary evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal search,
limiting the doctrine to derivative evidence. 51 Other courts
have found that the deterrent rationale behind the exclusionary
rule should guide application of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine regardless of any distinctions between primary and deriv-
ative evidence. 52 Some courts require the government to show
that it was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of
investigation at the time of the constitutional violations.5 3 The
inevitable discovery doctrine has been limited to cases where it
can be shown that an independent search is underway or would
occur as a matter of routine practice.5 4 The basic rationale is
that "[i]f the inevitable discovery doctrine exception can be ap-
48. Id. at 444-45.
49. Id. at 445-46. The Court rejected a requirement of good faith by officers,
reasoning that when an officer contemplates inevitable discovery "there will be
little to gain from taking any dubious shortcuts to obtain the evidence." Id. This
rationale has been called into question by situations like in United States v. Grif-
fin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1974), where the police performed an illegal search
while in the process of obtaining a search warrant and later tried to argue that the
inevitable discovery doctrine should be used to allow in the evidence discovered
during the warrant-less search. In such a situation, exclusion of the evidence
would put the police in a worse position, but exclusion is essential to prevent police
from taking the shortcut of searching without authority of a warrant.
50. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
51. United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and
Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 719-20
(D.C. Cir. 1992); People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Crossen, 536
P.2d 1263 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991).
52. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to draw dis-
tinctions between primary and derivative evidence. Id. at 979 n.7).
53. United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1037 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1987).
510 [Vol. 27:503
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plied only on the basis of the [government's] mere intention to
use legal means subsequently, the inquiry would hardly be on
historical facts."5 5 Most courts have rejected the rationale of "if
we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right."56 In
sum, most courts generally require that the hypothetical means
be independent (not causally related) of the initial taint; that
there be a strong probability that those means would have been
pursued; and that the government's hypothetical pursuit be
based upon a documented and historical policy or procedure.
B. Widespread Application of the Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Williams, cir-
cuit courts across the country have liberally applied the inevita-
ble discovery doctrine to prevent exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence.57 The circumstances of application range from inven-
tory searches to evidence obtained without a search warrant.
Most commentators have urged restraint, cautioning against
further erosion of Fourth Amendment protections.58 In the con-
text of America's ongoing push for further crime control,59 it is
unsurprising that the inevitable discovery doctrine has been
given a warm welcome among the varying Circuit Courts across
the country.
55. United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
56. United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 209-10 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
this line of reasoning on the basis that it would swallow the exclusionary rule).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 2003) (war-
rant-less search justified by eventual warrant); United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d
1047 (8th Cir. 1998) (illegal "Terry" pat-down justified by inevitable arrest for driv-
ing without a license); United States v. Griffiths, 47 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1995)
(inventory search of person); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 971 (1st Cir.
1994) (illegal vehicle search justified by eventual inventory search); United States
v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that oral policy requir-
ing search of rental vehicles before return to owners was sufficient to satisfy bur-
den of inevitable discovery).
58. See LAFAvE, supra note 37, § 11.4(a) at 269; see also Brian S. Conneely &
Edmond P. Murphy, Note and Comment, Inevitable Discovery: The Hypothetical
Independent Source Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137,
159 (1976-1977) (arguing that a mechanical application will encourage constitu-
tional shortcuts).
59. David Burnham, Putting the Legal System in the Dock, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 1996, at X05.
20071
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the most prevalent application has come in the
guise of vehicle inventory searches. 60 Generally, an inventory
search takes place after impoundment of a vehicle in order to
itemize and secure the contents. 61 An inventory search is only
valid when the police legally impound the vehicle.62 Vehicles
are impounded or taken into custody for a variety of reasons
including arrest, an expired license, 63 or even a lack of automo-
bile insurance. 64 The Supreme Court has granted police wide
latitude to arrest for minor traffic offenses where the relevant
state law grants such authority.65 Once an inventory search is
under way, the police search must be conducted according to
standardized police procedures. 66 The scope of the search may
not be entirely within the discretion of the police. 67 However,
the police may conduct a broad and detailed search of the vehi-
cle, including the opening of containers, when authorized by lo-
cal standardized procedures. 68
Given the wide latitude for both impounding vehicles and
searching them, it comes as no surprise that prosecutors have
vigorously attempted to utilize inventory searches as a means
to inevitably discovering evidence that was initially obtained
through unconstitutional means. 69 For example, in United
60. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 11.4, 243-44 (West, 3rd ed.
1996).
61. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
62. Id. at 373.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 1998) (during
traffic stop, driver was subjected to illegal search because he could not produce
license, gun found was admitted because officer would have inevitably discovered
gun upon running search of defendant and then arresting prior to finding lack of
license).
64. See Brent A. Rogers, Comment, Florida v. Wells: The Supreme Court By-
passes Opportunity to Protect Motorists Abuses of Police Discretion, 77 IowA L.
REV. 347, n.3 (Oct. 1991); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69 (sanctioning police as part
of their caretaking authority to take vehicles into custody for as little as impeding
the flow of traffic); United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2006).
65. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 321 (2001) (upholding constitu-
tionality of arrest of woman for seat-belt violation and subsequent search of
vehicle).
66. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
67. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
68. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 368-69 (opening a closed backpack within the car);
Wells, 495 U.S. at 2 (opening locked briefcase located in the trunk of the car).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 315 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Griffiths, 47
F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1995) (inventory search of person); United States v. Woody, 55
[Vol. 27:503512
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States v. Zapata, federal agents had an ongoing investigation
and surveillance of Zapata, based upon a reliable source impli-
cating he was involved in narcotics-related activity. 70 While fol-
lowing Zapata for some time, agents observed erratic driving,
discovering that the car he was driving was both unregistered
and uninsured. 71 Once Zapata had stopped at a rest stop, the
officers made their move, approaching Zapata in a fast food line
and asking him to accompany them into the parking lot.7 2
Eventually, the police asked Zapata for permission to search the
car.73 Zapata apparently agreed and officers found within the
trunk two duffel bags containing packages of cocaine. 74 The
Court questioned the validity of the consent and brief detention,
but decided to admit the seized evidence anyway on the grounds
that the police would have inevitably conducted an inventory
search once they impounded the vehicle for lack of insurance or
registration. 75 In so deciding, the Court refused to bar applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery doctrine on the basis that the
cocaine was primary evidence, reasoning that the primary/de-
rivative distinction is inapplicable because exclusion of primary
evidence would place the prosecution in a worse position had
the illegality never occurred. 76
Zapata represents the ability of police to forego the require-
ment of consent or a warrant before initiating the search of a
F.3d 1257, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d 373
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding that oral policy requiring search of rental vehicles before
return to owners was sufficient to satisfy burden of inevitable discovery); State v.
Moreau, 918 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2005); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 376
(Nev. 2003); Ettipio v. State, 794 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. App. 1990); but see United
States v. Kennedy, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29235, *17 (D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2004)
(reasoning that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable because there
was no evidence that an inventory search would have actually discovered the hid-
den narcotics).
70. United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 973 (1st Cir. 1994).
71. Id. at 973. In Massachusetts it was also unlawful to drive without a li-
cense or registration. Id. at n.2.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 978.
76. Id. at 979 n.7. In addition, the Court found that the legal means of discov-
ery need not be underway at the time an unlawful search transpires, only that the
authorities had the necessary information to undergo such legal means. Id. at 979
n.6.
2007] 513
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vehicle.7 7 The inevitable discovery doctrine has also been ap-
plied to illegal "Terry" pat downs. In United States v. Glenn,78
the Eighth Circuit found that although the police lacked a rea-
sonable suspicion to perform a search of Glenn's person, the evi-
dence obtained would have been inevitably discovered pursuant
to a search incident to arrest.79 The Court reasoned that the
police had the authority to arrest Glenn for driving without a
license and that they probably would have done so had they
never performed the illegal search.80
The most shocking application of the inevitable discovery
doctrine is where evidence obtained illegally without a search
warrant is admissible on the basis that the police would have
inevitably obtained a warrant, had they sought one.8' Those
courts allowing such application, have required the prosecution
to show the following: (1) the police had a high level of probable
cause to obtain a warrant; (2) the police were in the process of
obtaining a warrant; and (3) the same evidence would have
been obtained pursuant to the eventual warrant.8 2 Other courts
have rejected the inevitable discovery doctrine's application to
eventual warrants.8 3 These courts have reasoned that an appli-
77. Interestingly, the police had been pursuing an investigation of Zapata for
sometime and had not obtained a search warrant. One cannot help but ask
whether the police had acted in bad faith by pre-textually following Zapata, run-
ning his plates and then engaging in an illegal search knowing full well that it
would be admissible later on.
78. United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 1998).
79. Id. at 1049.
80. Id. at 1049-50 (finding that because the stop occurred on an interstate
highway and that Glenn had no other means of leaving that the officers would
have arrested him to prevent furthering the offense of driving without a license).
81. United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 2003); Unites States v.
Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1203-05 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Buchanan, 910
F.2d 1571, 1573 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ford, 22. F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Cas-
tillo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8248, *42-43 (D. Me. Mar. 1, 2006); United States v.
Rodriguez-Solis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6164, *51-52 (D. Neb. Jan. 27, 2006);
United States v. Castillo, Crim. No. 05-81-P-H, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8248, *42-43
(D. Me. Mar. 1, 2006).
82. Souza, 223 F.3d at 1203-05; United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 473-74
(2d Cir. 1995) (supporting similar test, but holding that in the situation where the
government failed to eventually obtain a warrant and where lacking a high level of
probable cause application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is inappropriate).
83. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding inevitable discovery rule inap-
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss3/5
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cation to eventual warrants would be a "radical departure from
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement precedent."' 4 As
the Echegoyen court noted, "[t]o excuse the failure to obtain a
warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and
could have obtained a warrant would completely obviate the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."8 5 In response,
courts applying the doctrine have argued that admitting the ev-
idence would not impair the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule, granting much deference to the good intentions of the po-
lice.8 6 The fact that some courts regularly apply the inevitable
discovery doctrine to legitimize warrant-less searches, makes
clear that doctrine has been greatly expanded since Nix, and
most importantly must be addressed by the Supreme Court.
C. Underlying Problems with the Inevitable Discovery
Doctrine
For there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion.
That is no sanction at all.8 7
The biggest problem with widespread application of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine is that by admitting otherwise ex-
cludable evidence, any deterrent rationale for unconstitutional
police activity is stymied by reducing the constitutional rule
sought to be protected to a "paper tiger."8 8 Justice Murphy's as-
sertion that the alternative to exclusion is no sanction at all
proves just as pertinent today, as the exclusionary rule is slowly
being eroded for violations occurring in our homes, cars and
streets. This is painfully visible in the application of the inevi-
table discovery doctrine to knock and announce violations and
plicable where there were no alternative legal means nor were any being actively
pursued at the time of the illegal search); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d
818, 823 (Mass. 1981).
84. Johnson, 22 F.3d at 684.
85. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280 n.7.
86. See United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 739-41 (1st Cir. 1986).
87. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S 25, 41 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
88. See Mattias Luukkonen, Knock, Knock. What's Inevitable There? An Anal-
ysis of the Applicability of the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery to Knock and An-
nounce Violations, 35 McGEORGE L. REV. 153, 177 (2004) (essentially, arguing that
an automatic application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to knock and an-
nounce violations would make the rule meaningless).
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was the main impetus for a majority of courts rejecting such
application.8 9
However, this problem is more difficult to see in the context
of unconstitutional searches justified by discovery pursuant to
hypothetically eventual inventory searches. The inevitable dis-
covery doctrine has the potential to make obsolete the constitu-
tional jurisprudence concerning vehicular searches, whenever
there is reason to arrest or impound during a traffic stop. There
is little reason to follow procedure and wait until the car is im-
pounded before conducting a full search of the car when there
are no repercussions. The inevitable discovery doctrine does
more than just reduce deterrence; it has the effect of encourag-
ing and justifying unconstitutional searches. The police have
an incentive to find evidence more quickly bypassing constitu-
tional restraints.90
Taken to its logical extremes, the inevitable discovery ex-
ception creates a situation where there is no recognizable expec-
tation of privacy in your vehicle if you are pulled over for
driving without insurance or a license, or you are intoxicated, or
you are in violation of some traffic law that gives police discre-
tion to impound your vehicle. Essentially, the police no longer
need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to conduct a search
of your car if there is some administrative violation.91 The abil-
ity to perform full searches without any probable cause opens
the door for police misconduct. It shifts the justifying rationale
from probable cause to some administrative oversight-erasing
the true intent of the Fourth Amendment protections. It is diffi-
cult to justify a search based on an underlying rationale of ad-
ministrative oversight, even for those that argue that the
89. See discussion, infra notes 90-94. The Supreme Court in Hudson ad-
dressed this issue by finding that other remedial options and internal police proce-
dures existed to provide the proper deterrence to uphold the constitutional
integrity of the rule. However, the court did not rest its decision on that issue,
rather it simply found that there was no causal "but for" relationship between the
violation and evidence seized. The majority's opinion created a very narrow inter-
pretation of "but for" causation and also complicated the test by adding an "attenu-
ated interests" inquiry.
90. See People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 911 (N.Y. 1987).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1047 (8th Cir. 1995) (re-
gistration and insurance); United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 971 (1st Cir. 1994)
(registration violation).
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founding principles of the Fourth Amendment rest more on a
concept of reasonableness rather than on probable cause.92
D. Inevitable Discovery Applied to Knock and Announce
Violations
Police are constitutionally required to knock and announce
their presence before lawfully executing a search warrant on a
home.93 The requirement of knocking and announcing is part of
the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment. 94 Knock
and announce is required under federal law, as well as most
state law. 95 The knock and announce requirement has a long
history under both English96 and American 97 common law. The
underlying rationale has been the protection of one's rights
within the sanctity of the home.98 The practical purpose of the
law has been to allow the occupants a reasonable time in which
to prepare themselves for police visitors.99
The knock and announce rule is subject to a few exceptions.
The police are not required to knock and announce when there
is a reasonable suspicion that evidence will be destroyed or
when announcement would place the police in considerable dan-
ger of harm.100 The Supreme Court has held that these excep-
92. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757 (Feb. 1994) (for the argument that the Fourth Amendment is
primarily principled on a theory of 'reasonableness.').
93. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
94. Id.
95. 18 U.S.C. 3109 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 28.1259(6) (LexisNexis
2005).
96. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195
(K.B. 1603) for support).
97. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933 (giving a great historical review of the Ameri-
can adoption of the English common law rule both at common law and through
state regulation); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958).
98. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195-96).
99. See E. Martha Estrada, A Toothless Tiger in the Constitutional Jungle:
The "Knock and Announce Rule" and the Sacred Castle Door, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 77, 79
(April 2005) (stating that "[alt its heart, the 'knock and announce' rule stands for
the dignity of the individual: the ability to prepare your property and your mind
for governmental intrusion of the most invasive sort").
100. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); United States v. Ramirez,
523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998).
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tions are fact intensive inquiries and per se rules exempting
police from the requirement are unconstitutional. 10 1
There has been much controversy as to whether the inevi-
table discovery doctrine may be applied to evidence obtained as
a result of a knock and announce violation. 10 2 Some courts have
answered yes, refusing to exclude evidence obtained subject to a
valid search warrant, but executed in violation of the knock and
announce rule. 10 3 The Michigan Supreme Court justified the
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine on the grounds
that "it was not the illegal means of entry that led to the discov-
ery of the evidence, but, rather, it was authority of the search
warrant that enabled the police to search and seize the con-
tested evidence." 10 4
It is not surprising, given the wide latitude of application
that circuit courts have granted to the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, that courts are legitimizing such an exception to the
knock and announce doctrine. The primary justification is that
exclusion would place the police in a worse position, not the
same, than had the illegality never occurred. 10 5 Placing the po-
lice in a worse position was not the purpose of the exclusionary
rule, nor does it strike the proper balance between deterrence
and admitting relevant and truthful evidence. 0 6
However, a majority of other courts have rejected this ratio-
nale, finding that application of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine would make the constitutional requirement of knock and
101. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S 385 (1997) (ruling that state law ex-
empting per se knock and announce requirements for felony drug searches are
unconstitutional).
102. See e.g., Robin L. Gentry, Note, Why Knock? The Door Will Inevitably
Open: An Analysis of People v. Stevens and the Michigan Supreme Court's Depar-
ture From Fourth Amendment Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1659 (Fall 2000); Troy
E. Golden, Note and Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The De-
mands of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the Disagreement Among
the Federal Courts, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 97 (1998); Loly Garcia Tor, Note, Mandating
Exclusion For Violations of the Knock and Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REV. 852
(Oct. 2003).
103. United States v. Langford, 314 F.3d 892, 894 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jones,
149 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 1998); People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. 1999); but
see Lee v. State, 774 A.2d 1183, 1192 (Md. 2001).
104. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 64.
105. Id. at 64.
106. Id.
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announce totally obsolete. 107 The Supreme Court, in two older
cases, upheld the exclusion of evidence obtained through a vio-
lation of the knock and announce requirement. 08 However,
these two cases have been distinguished on the grounds that in
both cases the police did not have a warrant, and the exclusion
was not based upon the Fourth Amendment, but rather upon a
federal statute. 0 9 In response to this apparent split, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Hudson v. Michigan. In de-
termining the applicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine
to knock and announce violations, the court also had the oppor-
tunity to flush out many of the issues plaguing the doctrine.
II. Hudson v. Michigan
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Hudson v. Michigan"0
represents an important examination of the costs and benefits
of the exclusionary rule and the requirement of causation as ap-
plied to Fourth Amendment violations. In Hudson, the Court
had a great opportunity to flush out some of the issues regard-
ing the inevitable discovery doctrine's application, especially
considering the fact that the question certified was whether the
inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se exception to the
exclusionary rule for knock and announce violations."' Such a
per se exception creates a very interesting question regarding
the degree of causation required between the illegally seized ev-
107. United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1993); Mazepink v. State, 987 S.W.2d 648,
656-58 (Ark. 1999); State v. Lee, 821 A.2d 922 (Md. 2003); State v. Flippo, 575
S.E.2d 170, 190 (W. Va. 2002); Price v. State, 93 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)
(reasoning that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine would "completely
viscerate" the fundamental privacy and safety interests of the knock and announce
rule).
108. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 301 (1958).
109. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995) (discussing
applicability).
110. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).
111. The question certified on appeal was:
Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment "knock and an-
nounce" violation, as the Seventh Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court
have held, or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations, as the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals have held?
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idence and the legal inevitable means of discovery. Unfortu-
nately, the Court danced around the issue of inevitable
discovery, ignoring the doctrine and focusing solely on the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule.112 Essentially, the Court held
that the evidence derived from the search of Mr. Hudson's
home, although the warrant was unconstitutionally executed
(violation of knock and announce requirement), did not require
exclusion, because the causal relationship between the seizure
of the evidence and the illegal execution of the warrant was too
attenuated. 113 In doing so, the Court focused on the "substan-
tial social costs" imposed by application of the exclusionary rule,
reasoning that exclusion is appropriate only "'where its deter-
rence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.' 114
Regarding causation, the Court rejected a strict "but for"
application for exclusion, reasoning that such a test was never
intended by Mapp v. Ohio." 5 Instead, the majority opinion re-
affirmed that, even assuming a "but for" connection, the appro-
priate question should be, "'whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or in-
stead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.'"11 6 The Court added that, in addition to a direct
evidentiary causation, attenuation may also arise on a more
theoretical level, namely, when the "interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be
served by suppression of the evidence obtained."11 7 At the end
of the day, the Supreme Court essentially crafted a two part
test to determine whether evidence should be excluded: (1)
Question Certified, Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (U.S. June
22, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-01360qp.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2007).
112. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162-65 (2006).
113. Id. at 2165.
114. Id. (quoting Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363
(1998)).
115. Id. at 2164. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court,
for the first time applied the exclusionary rule to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment. Mapp gave a very broad application to the exclusionary rule,
finding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is . . . inadmissible . . . ." Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
116. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2164 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 487-88 (1963)).
117. Id.
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whether its deterrent benefits outweigh its substantial social
costs, and (2) whether there is causal relationship between the
illegality and the evidence seized.
The Court flushed out what it meant by its "attenuation of
interests" test in its application to the knock and announce vio-
lation. It found that the knock and announce doctrine protects
the interests of human life, property, privacy and dignity.118
The warrant requirement entitles citizens to shield "their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" from government scrutiny.119
The court found that the interests protected by the knock and
announce doctrine (property, privacy and dignity) are not re-
lated to the interests protected by the warrant requirement
(right to shield evidence from the government's eyes). 20 Con-
cluding, the Court held that, "[s] ince the interests that were vio-
lated in this case have nothing to with the seizure of the
evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable." 12 In case that
reasoning was found suspect, the Court felt it necessary to dis-
cuss the second part of the of test: balance between deterrence
and the social costs of exclusion. 122
By implication, the Court admitted that application of the
exclusionary rule to knock and announce would serve as a de-
terrent to future violations. However, the Court inevitably
found that various social costs weigh against such deterrent
value. 23 Those costs include, as always, the risk of releasing
dangerous criminals back into society. 24 Additionally, the
court found that application of the exclusionary rule in this con-
text would release the "flood" gates of litigation' 25 and lead to
118. Id. at 2165.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Court's distinction between the competing interests is suspect, to
say the least. Both the warrant requirement and the knock and announce doctrine
arose in different contexts, however they both share a similar fear of government
intrusion. The Court's description of the warrant requirement is narrow and it is
more than arguable that the interests protected are broader and more closely al-
igned with those of the knock and announce doctrine. Moreover, both violations
are "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
123. Id. at 2168.
124. Id. at 2165-66.
125. Id. at 2166. The increase in litigation would result because of an in-
crease in defendants' challenging the justification for the knock and announce vio-
lation. Id. In a moment of quotable whimsy, the court explained: "The cost of
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uncertainty by police officers serving warrants. 126 In its
weighted balancing act, the Court found that the deterrent ben-
efits associated with exclusion are minimal compared with high
social costs. 127 Interestingly and potentially far reaching, the
Court found it highly relevant that other remedial options ex-
isted, so as to significantly diminish the deterrent benefits of
deterrence. 128 Most significantly, the Court found that the op-
tion of relief through the Civil Rights Act is possible and prefer-
able.1 29 Also, in a rather oxymoronic way, the Court found that
increased police professionalism, training in civil liberties, and
the desire for promotion through the ranks, would adequately
deter police misconduct. 130
The strength of the majority opinion was limited by a con-
curring opinion by Justice Kennedy' 31 and a four justice dissent
written by Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Stevens, Sou-
ter, and Ginsburg. 32 The dissent represents a powerful re-
minder that this area is far from fully decided and much
litigation remains on many of the key issues. The dissent takes
pains to point out that the majority opinion "represents a signif-
entering this lottery would be small, but the jackpot enormous: suppression of all
evidence, amounting in many cases to a get-out-of-jail-free card." Id.
126. Id. However, these are the same costs that accompany every Fourth
Amendment case. As the Dissent aptly points out, "[t]he majority's 'substantial
social costs' argument is an argument against the Fourth Amendment's exclusion-
ary principle itself. And it is an argument that this Court, until now, has consist-
ently rejected." Id. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2168. The Court states that even if suppression were the only way
to deter knock and announce violations, "it would not necessarily justify suppres-
sion." Id. at 2166.
128. Id. at 2167.
129. Id. at 2167-68. However, there is little evidence of successful 42 U.S.C.
1983 actions seeking damages for knock and announce violations. Id. at 2174
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (the court could not find a single case where anything but
nominal damages was awarded); cf. Stewart, supra note 22, at 1388 (arguing that
the deterrent effect of damages actions "can hardly be said to be great," because
they are "expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and rarely successful").
130. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006). Such an assertion is
ironic because the original rationale for creation and application of the exclusion-
ary rule was that the police could not be entrusted with protection of civil liberties,
since it is in there very nature as officers to solve crimes and catch criminals, even
if that means violating certain liberties. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
929 (1984) (Brennon, J., dissenting); United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 394
(1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
131. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170.
132. Id. at 2171.
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icant departure from the Court's precedents. And it weakens,
perhaps destroys, much of the practical value of the Constitu-
tion's knock and announce protection."133 Specifically, the ma-
jority misinterprets the long held application of the
exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment, as well as creating
a new, unprecedented element of the attenuation principle.
According to the dissent, the exclusionary rule should apply
to knock and announce violations, just as it does to any other
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 134 An evaluation of
whether an officer complied with the knock and announce re-
quirement requires assessing the "reasonableness of a search or
seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. 135 Constitutionally, an
unreasonable search and seizure is an illegal one. 136 Thus, ac-
cording to the law set out in both Weeks and Mapp, the use of
illegally searched and seized evidence is barred from use in
criminal trials. 137 Anything less, the dissent argues, would
amount to a complete disregard of both the Weeks and Mapp
decisions.138
Second, the dissent argues that the knock and announce vi-
olation in the case was a "but for" cause of obtaining the evi-
dence, and that the majority's assertion that it was not, rests on
a fundamental misunderstanding of the law.139 The dissent
found that the majority's separation of the manner of entry
from the related search was too thinly sliced. 140 Moreover, the
majority's attempt to diminish the causal relationship by em-
phasizing the fact that the police were in possession of a war-
rant, implicitly relied upon the inevitable discovery doctrine
and misstates it.14' The inevitable discovery doctrine stands for
the principle that "the remedial purposes of the exclusionary
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2173.
135. Id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2174. The dissent also emphasized the important of deterrence
and the inefficacy of 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions to fill the void left by the absence of the
exclusionary rule. Id. (quoting Justice Potter Stewart, supra note 22, at 1388 (the
deterrent effect of damage actions "can hardly be said to be great," as such actions
are "expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and rarely successful.")).
139. Id. at 2177.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2177-78.
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rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered through
a 'later, lawful seizure' that is 'genuinely independent of an ear-
lier, tainted one."'1 42 In Hudson, the existence of a warrant does
not make the inevitable discovery doctrine applicable, since the
entry was illegal and the warrant cannot be disassociated as
independent. 143 To emphasize his point, Justice Breyer asks
the question of whether "a warrant that authorizes entry into a
home on Tuesday [would] permit the police to enter on
Monday?"'144
Lastly, the dissent argued that the majority gave the word
"attenuation" new meaning, 45 departing from the common evi-
dentiary meaning, towards a more esoteric ambiguous defini-
tion.146 This is a radical departure from the earlier meaning of
the word and its application to the exclusionary rule.
The Court's departure from earlier interpretations of the
exclusionary rule begs the question of what effect it may have
on the volatile area of inevitable discovery. Much of the Court's
opinion was dicta, considering that it found no "but for" causal
connection between the evidence seized and the illegal execu-
tion of the warrant. 147 However, both the lack of a "but for" con-
nection in the context of knock and announce violations and the
Court's new rationale regarding the exclusionary rule will inva-
riably have long-ranging effects on the inevitable discovery doc-
trine's application in other situations, such as, warrant-less
search and seizures.
142. Id. at 2178 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1998)).
143. Id. at 2179.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2179-80
146. Id. Attenuation occurs when "the interest protected by the constitutional
guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evi-
dence obtained." Id. at 2180.
147. See id. at 2170 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (limiting support to the "but
for" causation part of the majority opinion, not Part IV of the majority opinion).
This may prove a vital sticking ground for future decisions regarding warrant-less
and inventory searches.
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III. Expanding the Reach of the Inevitable Discovery
Exception: The Effects of Hudson v. Michigan
A. Limiting the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule
In Hudson, the Supreme Court made a decision to admit
evidence obtained as a result of a violation of a key ingredient of
the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the Court expanded on the
exclusionary rule's attenuation principle, creating a two prong
test. The first part of the test is a "but for" causal relationship
between the evidence seized and the constitutional violation. 148
The second prong of the test, "interest attenuation," is whether
the interests protected by the constitutional guarantee which
was violated would be served by the interests protected by the
exclusionary rule.149
Without mentioning the inevitable discovery doctrine, the
Hudson Court implicitly incorporated the inevitable discovery
doctrine into the two prong analysis of attenuation. In refer-
ence to the first prong, the court concluded that there was no
"but for" causation because "[wihether the preliminary misstep
[the knock and announce violation] had occurred or not, the po-
lice would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and
would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house."150
Essentially, the warrant severs the tie between the illegality
and evidence seized because "but for" the violation the police
would have found the evidence through the warrant. 15' To
make this argument, the court must causally separate a valid
warrant from its illegal execution. 152 Without explicitly saying
so, the court makes the argument that the illegal execution of a
warrant does not taint the actual legality of the warrant itself.
This is the same argument that the inevitable discovery
doctrine makes, by asking whether the "inevitable" means of
148. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
149. Id. at 2164-65.
150. Id. at 2164. However, this is not entirely true, because the police may
not have found the drugs and evidence if they had complied with the knock and
announce doctrine, because the evidence could have been hidden or destroyed.
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Breyer points this anomaly out when he asks the question of
whether "a warrant that authorizes entry into a home on Tuesday permit the po-
lice to enter on Monday." Id. at 2179 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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discovery is sufficiently purged of the initial illegality. 153 The
court would have to find that the illegal execution of a warrant
does not causally taint the actual warrant itself, so as to require
exclusion of evidence seized as a result. 54 This was the argu-
ment relied upon by the Michigan Supreme Court and the Jus-
tice Department in their argument before the Court in
Hudson.155
The second prong of attenuation that the Supreme Court
analyzed also incorporates the policy concepts of the inevitable
discovery doctrine. Essentially, the court is asking whether the
interests protected by the constitutional guarantee would be
served by suppression of the evidence obtained. 56 The interest
served by suppression of the evidence is the deterrence of future
violations of the guarantee. So the question becomes whether
suppression would actually deter future violations so as to pro-
tect the interests served. This is similar to the concept of inevi-
table discovery, that exclusion would place the police in a worse
position had the illegality never occurred. 5 7 Phrased another
way, exclusion is not meant to put the person complaining of
the violation in a better position had the illegality never oc-
curred. Thus, the argument would be that there is a minimal
deterrent value because the evidence would have been obtained
in a lawful manner anyway.
What is clear is that Hudson represents a major develop-
ment and expansion of the Supreme Court's attack on the exclu-
sionary rule. At the moment it is unclear how much of an
impact Hudson will have on future cases and their application
of the exclusionary rule. The attenuation test enunciated in
Hudson implicitly incorporates the causal separations first de-
veloped by the inevitable discovery doctrine. 158 It is no longer
enough to ask whether evidence was seized as a result of an
153. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (the inevitable means must
be lawful); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (lawful
means are independent of initial illegal means, so as to lack any of the unlawful
taint).
154. See People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 64 (Mich. 1999).
155. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2178.
156. Id. at 2164.
157. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445-46.
158. An interesting question would be whether this new development would
shift the prosecution's burden of proof. Generally, the prosecution has the burden
of establishing the inevitability of the lawful means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
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illegality, the question is now, granted the illegality, whether
the same evidence "would have" been obtained by another "inev-
itable" lawful means. 159 Left unanswered is how these princi-
ples would apply to a warrant-less search.
B. Justifying Warrant-less Searches
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine is presented with a dire problem when used to prevent ex-
clusion on the basis that a warrant would have been or was in
the process of being obtained. Technically, the exception to the
exclusionary rule should apply, because the evidence would
have been inevitably obtained once a valid warrant was issued,
which was under way at the time of search.160 Exclusion would
place the police in a worse position had the illegality not oc-
curred. 16' If the illegality had not occurred, the police would
have eventually obtained a valid warrant and obtained the evi-
dence, now excluded. This issue was recently considered in
dicta by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Elder.162
431, 444 (1984). Now the defense would have the burden of showing an absence of
inevitable discovery, rather the prosecution having the final burden of persuasion.
159. This is just like the independent source doctrine, except that there never
was an independent source. Unlike in Murray, when there is not a warrant or the
one warrant was unlawfully executed, the question still has to be phrased in the
hypothetical. In Murray, the court found that, although the first search was ille-
gal, the second search executed by a warrant was legal. Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 553 (1988). The second search was an independent source of the
evidence, because it was not tainted by anything obtained from the first illegal one.
Id. Here, the warrant and illegal execution cannot be neatly separated like the
two searches in Murray. The court must ask in the abstract whether, without the
illegal execution, the warrant would have inevitably led to the same evidence and
whether the illegal execution taints the warrant, so as to render it "useless."
160. The Seventh Circuit has been the main impetuous for such an applica-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Goins, 437 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Brown, 328 F.3d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197,
1203-05 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ford, 22. F.3d 374, 374 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Buchanan, 910 F.2d 1571, 1573 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1225 (2d Cir. 1987).
161. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). In the converse, it has been
stated the exclusionary rule "should not be used to make the person whose rights
have been violated better off than he would be if no violation had occurred."
United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 2003).
162. 466 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2006).
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
In Elder, the District Court held that the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine applies to prevent exclusion of evidence seized
without a warrant. 163 In Elder, the police responded to a 911
call informing them that there was "meth" in the area. 64 The
police responded to the defendant's home. 165 Upon arrival the
police searched a shed next to the house and found chemicals
used to make meth. 166 Later, after speaking with the defen-
dant's wife, they searched and seized the evidence in the
shed. 167 There was never any attempt to retrieve a warrant to
search the shed, although one of the officers testified at the mo-
tion hearing that he had probable cause.1 68 The District Court
did not determine whether the police had consent to search the
shed, because it found that the inevitable discovery rule
applied.169
The District Court held that the police had probable cause
and would have eventually obtained a warrant had the illegal
search never occurred. 170 The District Court based its holding
on the recent Seventh Circuit opinion of United States v.
Brown.17' In Brown the court held that even though there was
clearly no valid consent and no warrant, the evidence seized
should not be excluded because the police would have inevitably
obtained a warrant. 172 The court tamed its holding by reason-
ing that the officers were acting in good faith, in that they
thought they had consent and if they knew for sure that they
did not they would have obtained a warrant. 73
163. United States v. Elder, 352 F. Supp. 2d 880, 888 (C.D. Ill. 2005).
164. Id. at 881-82.
165. Id. at 882.
166. Id. at 883.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 886-87. Most likely there was no consent; both the wife and defen-
dant's father testified that they gave permission to search the house, but never the
shed. There was no contradicting testimony from the officers. Id. at 886 n.3.
170. The court reasoned that "[t]o demonstrate that a discovery was truly 'in-
evitable,' the prosecution must establish that it had probable cause and prove the
existence of 'a chain of events that would have led to a warrant.. . independent of
the search."' Id. at 887 (citing United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 352, 357 (7th Cir.
2003)).
171. Brown, 328 F.3d at 352.
172. Id. at 356-57.
173. Id. at 357.
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Both Elder and Brown are similar to the fact pattern in
United States v. Murray and the court's application of the inde-
pendent source doctrine. 174 However, in Murray the police actu-
ally returned with a warrant, and the court asked the question
of whether the valid warrant and search was tainted by any-
thing gathered in the first illegal search.175 In Elder, there was
no warrant; therefore, the court had to apply the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit conveniently side stepped this thorny
issue by holding that because the initial search of the shed in
response to the 911 call was reasonable, the subsequent search
was also reasonable. However, Judge Easterbrook did not fail
to posture that "[tihe usual understanding of that doctrine is
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when all steps
required to obtain a valid warrant have been taken before the
premature search occurs." 176 The court further reasoned that if
probable cause alone, without a warrant, were enough to evoke
the inevitable discovery doctrine, then the exclusionary rule
would be effectively limited to searches without probable
cause. 77 This is a revolutionary posture of the Fourth Amend-
ment's requirements. What is even more surprising is that,
three judges sitting on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals be-
lieved that this "would be a good development," since "the main
requirement of the [F]ourth [Almendment ... is that the search
be reasonable."17 8 The opinion that a search is reasonable with-
out a warrant, as long as there is probable cause, flies in the
face of Supreme Court precedent holding that the warrant is an
integral part of establishing probable cause. 79 Warrants are is-
174. United States v. Murray, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
175. Id. at 542.
176. United States v. Elder, 466 F.3d 1090, 1191 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Mur-
ray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).
The independent source doctrine, as articulated in Murray, does not stand for this
proposition, since without a warrant there is no independent source. It is debata-
ble whether the inevitable discovery doctrine stands for this proposition.
177. Id.
178. Id. Judge Easterbrook wrote the opinion and was joined by Judges Pos-
ner and Sykes. For more information on the "movement" re-interpreting the
Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" clause, see generally Amar, supra
note 92.
179. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). It is a "'basic princi-
ple of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a
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sued by neutral magistrates, and without that neutrality, police
officers' would take the role of determining whether probable
cause existed to invade the sanctity of the home. °80 The Sev-
enth Circuit explicitly left the decision of "whether to trim the
exclusionary rule in this fashion" to the Supreme Court. 181
Even though the court claimed to reserve the issue for the Su-
preme Court, they have already trimmed the exclusionary rule
by invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine in Brown.
Such a decision by the Supreme Court may not be so far off,
and its decision may be highly influenced by its revision of the
exclusionary rule in Hudson. On the surface, Hudson is easily
distinguished from the warrant-less search case, because in
Hudson the officers had a valid search warrant, but just failed
to legally execute it. In a case like Elder, there was no warrant.
In Hudson, the circumstance that broke the causal link was the
existence of the warrant.182 In a case like Elder, the argument
must be that the existence of probable cause and the likelihood
that the police would have pursued a warrant are enough to
break the causal taint between the warrant-less search and the
evidence seized. 8 3 The eventual legal means may be great
enough to break the taint of initial illegality.
Certainly, the second interest attenuation test crafted by
the Supreme Court would support the argument. The warrant
requirement protects citizens' entitlement to "shield "their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects." 8 4 More generally, the war-
rant requirement protects citizens from unreasonable
searches. 8 5  Reasonableness is determined by probable
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.'" Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559
(2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
180. Police officers cannot be trusted with such discretion because it is in
their interest to be zealous investigators, checked only by the courts. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennon, J., dissenting).
181. Elder, 466 F.3d at 1091.
182. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
183. For example, in United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1203-05 (10th
Cir. 2000), the court required the prosecution to show the following: (1) the police
had a high level of probable cause to obtain a warrant; (2) the police were in the
process of obtaining a warrant; and (3) the same evidence would have been ob-
tained pursuant to the eventual warrant.
184. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165.
185. Id.
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cause. 86 If probable cause is present and there is evidence that
a warrant would have been issued, suppression would not serve
the interests of protecting against unreasonable searches. Like
in inevitable discovery cases, suppression would place the police
in a worse position had the warrant-less search never taken
place. Like in situations where a warrant-less search is justi-
fied by an eventual vehicular inventory search, the deterrent
value of exclusion is minimal because the police would have ob-
tained the evidence anyway through legal means. 8 7
However, the inquiry would not end with causation. The
court would also have to decide whether the deterrent benefits
of exclusion outweigh its "substantial social costs." 8 8 In Hud-
son, the court found that exclusion would obviously be a deter-
rent to future knock and announce violations; however, it found
that other remedial options existed to better remedy the viola-
tion. 18 9 The court placed a large emphasis on the societal costs
of exclusion because of the constable's blunder. 90 However, the
Supreme Court would be hard pressed to find that section 1983
actions and increased police integrity are enough to safeguard
the warrant requirement without completely eradicating it.
This is in line with the majority of other courts considering
the issue of warrant-less searches and the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Most courts have rejected this application of the inevi-
table discovery exception on the grounds that it would effec-
tively make the warrant requirement obsolete.' 91 Although
technically a warrant-less search may be justified by inevitable
discovery pursuant to a yet obtained warrant, the effect cannot
be constitutionally justified. This paradox presents the main
problem associated with the rule. 92 The inevitable discovery
186.
187. See United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994).
188. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165 (citing Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
189. Id. at 2167.
190. Id. at 2166-68. This is the argument that the Seventh Circuit made in
Elder, reasoning that "[a]llowing the criminal to go free because of an administra-
tive gaffe that does not affect substantial rights seems excessive." United States v.
Elder, 466 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 2006) (the violation of the warrant require-
ment not being a substantial right).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986).
192. See Johnson, 22 F.3d at 683.
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exception is not narrowly tailored to adequately protect individ-
ual liberties when the only limitation is that the evidence would
have been obtained through lawful means. Even when the pos-
sibility that evidence would have been obtained lawfully is
clear, the taint of the evidence is often too great to justify ad-
mission. In Hudson, the Supreme Court's posturing of the ex-
clusionary rule's principle of attenuation in the hypothetical
("would have") and its creation of an attenuated interests test
comes very close to engulfing the principles of the inevitable
discovery exception. In doing so, the court has re-crafted the
scope and limits of the exclusionary rule, so as to include the
possibility that evidence seized without a warrant is not pro-
tected by the exclusionary rule-much like the result when the
inevitable discovery doctrine is taken to its logical extremes.
IV. Imposing Limitations: Restoring Constitutional Integrity
to the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery
"Two roads diverged in a wood,
and I-I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference."193
The most logical and judicially prudent way to limit the
stretch of the inevitable discovery doctrine would be to limit its
application only to derivative evidence obtained as a result of
the constitutional violation. Primary evidence would be inap-
plicable to the inevitable discovery doctrine because it is too
tainted by the initial illegality to ensure further deterrence of
police illegality in the future. Some courts have adopted this
approach as the only reasonable policy. 9 4 Primary evidence is
loosely defined as "'tangible materials obtained either during or
as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." ' 195 For evidence dis-
covered after the primary illegality-derivative evidence-the
193. ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: A SELEC-
TION OF ROBERT FROST'S POEMS 270, 271 (Henry Holt & Company 1951).
194. See United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred
and Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 719-
20 (D.C. Cir. 1992); People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Crossen,
536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
195. Stith, 506 N.E.2d at 913 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
485 (1963)).
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question to be considered is the degree of taint.196 Determining
how tainted the evidence is requires a balancing of the individ-
ual intrusion, police deterrence, and need for relevant evidence
in prosecuting crime. 197 The problems associated with warrant-
less search cases make it clear that only a ban on primary evi-
dence obtained is capable of properly deterring widespread po-
lice misconduct.
Appellate courts that have not adopted a bright-line ban on
primary evidence have developed a number of different ap-
proaches to narrow the application of the inevitable discovery
exception. 19 Some courts have required a three part test: (1)
that the legal means are truly independent from the illegality;
(2) that both the use of the legal means and the discovery by
that means would be inevitable; and (3) that the application of
the inevitable discovery exception does not provide an incentive
for police misconduct or significantly weaken the Fourth
Amendment protections. 199 These requirements have posed
some serious questions for courts in varied contexts.
Some courts have worried that allowing the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine to apply based on routine procedures is too spec-
ulative.200 To stymie that speculation, these courts have
required the police to show, not only that there was a hypotheti-
cal procedure that would have produced the same evidence, but
that those other procedures were being actively pursued prior to
the time the evidence was obtained through illegal means. 201
However, the active pursuit requirement does not solve the
196. United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and
Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 719 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
197. Id. at 719-21.
198. See infra notes 200-217 and accompanying text.
199. See People v. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Mich. 1999) (citing United
States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986)); United States v. Rullo, 748 F.
Supp. 36, 44 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding the inevitable discovery doctrine inapplica-
ble because although the police would have inevitably found the evidence through
lawful means, failure to exclude would create too great an incentive for police
misconduct).
200. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984) (requiring a demonstration
of historical fact establishing that the evidence would have been found).
201. See Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1986 (11th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Brookins, 614
F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980); Golden, supra note 102.
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problem highlighted within warrant requirement circum-
stances. 2
02
For example, in the context of knock and announce viola-
tions or warrant-less searches, the legal means is the valid
search warrant. Obviously this meets the active pursuit re-
quirement, since getting the warrant is an active pursuit and
the warrant itself is the legal means attenuated from the ille-
gality. The court in People v. Stevens ruled that there was no
causal relationship between the knock and announce violation
and the warrant (eventual legal means).20 3 Without the causal
relationship, there was no illegal taint, thus precluding exclu-
sion.204 This was reasoning that the Supreme Court eventually
agreed with in Hudson, but incorporated into the attenuation
doctrine instead.205
However, when there is a causal gap between the legal
means and the violation, the active pursuit doctrine is not a
useful limitation in preventing the inevitable discovery doctrine
from infringing on the Fourth Amendment.
A few state courts have attempted to develop a good faith
rule incorporated in the inevitable discovery exception. 20 6 How-
ever, in Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court ended any dispute
about such a requirement in federal courts, reasoning that
there was no reason to inquire into the subjective intent of the
police officers. 20 7 In contrast, law professor Eugene Shapiro ar-
gues that a good faith requirement is essential in determining
the applicability of the inevitable discovery exception, because
any potential admissibility or exclusion is essential to deter-
rence of police misconduct. 208 When evidence is admissible
through the inevitable discovery exception, police may be en-
couraged to take constitutional shortcuts, when they know
202. See Luukkonen, supra note 88, at 178.
203. Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 64.
204. Id. at 60.
205. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006).
206. See State v. Wahl, 450 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990) (requiring that the police
show an absence of bad faith); see generally John E. Fennelly, Refinement of the
Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need for A Good-Faith Requirement, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1085 (1991).
207. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 467 (1984).
208. Eugene L. Shapiro, Active Pursuit, Inevitable Discovery, and the Federal
Circuits: The Search for Manageable Limitations Upon an Expansive Doctrine, 39
GONZ. L. REV. 295, 308 (2003).
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there are no repercussions. 2 9 Indeed, the main impetus for the
rule is to prevent relevant and truthful evidence from being ex-
cluded because of the "constable's blunder,"210 when it may have
been inevitably discovered through lawful means. 211 When po-
lice act in bad faith, taking shortcuts around constitutional pro-
cedures, we are no longer dealing with a mere blunder, but
rather a deliberate and effective way of getting around the
Constitution.
The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed a good
faith requirement, but has considered the problem of deter-
rence, ruling that the inevitable discovery exception does not
apply to primary evidence obtained as a result of the initial ille-
gality.212 In People v. Stith, the police unlawfully searched the
cab of a truck trailer during a routine traffic stop, uncovering a
loaded gun.21 3 The evidence was admitted at trial on the basis
that the police would have discovered the evidence pursuant to
a legal inventory search, if they had performed a registration
check and discovered that the vehicle was stolen.21 4 The New
York Court of Appeals rejected this line of reasoning, holding
that application of the inevitable discovery exception to primary
evidence would "amount to a post hoc rationalization of the ini-
tial wrong," leading to "an unacceptable dilution of the exclu-
sionary rule."215 The Court went on to reason that a failure to
exclude primary evidence would encourage unlawful searches
by police in hope that probable cause would develop after the
209. Id.
210. See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.").
211. Nix, 467 U.S. at 488 (noting that the inevitable discovery doctrine helps
to dissipate the extreme effect of Cardozo's reasoning, by allowing evidence to be
admissible when there is no sufficient nexus between the illegality or blunder and
the means inevitably discovered by).
212. People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987); see also People v. Turriago,
90 N.Y.2d 77 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies to
secondary evidence seized pursuant to a hypothetical inventory search); People v.
Solano, 539 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. Div. 1989) (refusing to apply the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine to primary evidence seized during illegal inventory search); but see
United States v. Pimentel, 810 F.2d 366, 368 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting any distinc-
tion between direct and indirect evidence).
213. Id. at 912.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 914 (emphasis in original).
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fact.216 In addition to New York, the Court of Appeals in the
District of Columbia and the highest court in Oregon have both
ruled along similar lines. 217
Limiting the inevitable discovery doctrine to derivative evi-
dence is contravention of the Supreme Court's opinion in Hud-
son v. Michigan. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the
exclusionary rule may not apply even if there is a "but for" link
between the evidence and illegal taint.218 If finding a "but for"
connection, the exclusionary rule may not apply if the interests
served by the "right" are not served by the interests of exclu-
sion 219 or when the substantial social costs of exclusion out-
weigh the benefits of deterrence. 220 Whether the tainted
evidence is derivative or primary, the decision to apply the ex-
clusionary rule involves a complicated process of balancing all
the interests involved.
The Supreme Court should limit its decision in Hudson so
that the exclusionary rule would still be applicable to the situa-
tion where the police attempt to justify a warrant-less search on
the basis that they could have obtained a warrant. This reason-
ing is along the same line as those cases holding that the inevi-
table discovery doctrine is inapplicable where the police
attempt to justify admission on the grounds that they were in
the process of obtaining a warrant.221 The dissent in Hudson
addresses this situation reasoning that the inevitable discovery
doctrine cannot be used to "avoid suppression of evidence seized
without a warrant (or pursuant to a defective warrant) simply
by showing that it could have obtained a valid warrant had it
sought one." 222 It is not appropriate to apply the inevitable dis-
216. Id.
217. United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and
Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in United States Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 719-20
(D.C. Cir. 1992); State v. Crossen, 536 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Or. Ct. App. 1975).
218. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2006). When the police
would not have obtained the evidence "but for" the constitutional violation, the
evidence is considered "primary."
219. Id. at 2164-65.
220. Id. at 2165-66.
221. See United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d
818, 823 (Mass. 1981).
222. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2178.
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covery doctrine in circumstances where a failure to exclude
would eliminate all incentive for police to abide by the
Constitution. 223
Even if the police maintain that standardized procedures
would have uncovered the same evidence, not excluding pri-
mary evidence would encourage further police shortcuts and fail
to deter future unconstitutional activity. 224 This can be seen in
the context of knock and announce cases, where the evidence
obtained is a direct result of the illegal entrance. Deterrence of
police misconduct is especially important when, unlike in Hud-
son, there is no warrant. Not excluding the evidence can only
send one message to the police: that the Constitution is not a
standard to be judged by, but merely a signpost, long stripped of
any meaningful direction.
V. Conclusion
It has been over twenty years since the Supreme Court has
made any decision discussing the inevitable discovery doc-
trine. 225 Circuit and state courts are increasingly becoming
more divided on the doctrine's scope and applicability. The Su-
preme Court should lay down a bright-line rule determining the
future effect of the inevitable discovery rule. In doing so, the
Court must keep in mind the inherent potential for the doctrine
to weaken constitutional protections by avoiding the exclusion-
ary rule, such as, in the case of warrant-less searches. Limits
must be set in order to reign in the scope of the doctrine. Only
by creating a bright-line rule prohibiting application to primary
evidence, can the court ensure the proper deterrence necessary
for protecting our fundamental rights under the Constitution.
223. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280 n.7; c.f. Johnson, 22 F.3d at 684. This is the
third prong in test developed by the First Circuit in United States v. Silvestri, 787
F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir. 1986). For an application, see United States v. Rullo, 748 F.
Supp. 36, 44-45 (D. Mass. 1990). The problem with this test is determining when a
constitutional right has been made obsolete by a failure to exclude.
224. C.f Stewart, supra note 22, at 1389 (arguing that for constitutional viola-
tions, "a remedy is required that inspires the police officer to channel his enthusi-
asm to apprehend a criminal toward the need to comply with the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment. There is only one such remedy-the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence.").
225. The last and only decision the court made was in Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431 (1984).
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Particularly, where warrant-less searches are involved, exclu-
sion is the only remedy capable of ensuring future compliance
with the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.
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